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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
David N. Burggraf appeals from the district court's restitution order, arguing that 
the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay $500 to his ex-wife to 
reimburse her for the amount deducted from the insurance payment for the loss of the 
vehicle Burggraf wrecked when he committed the offense of felony DUI. Burggraf also 
appeals from the district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion for leniency. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
According to the Presentence Report ("PSI"), the facts underlying Burggraf's 
conviction for felony DUI are as follows: 
On August 31, 2013, the Fremont County Sheriff's Office was dispatched 
to Lakeside Lodge "for a domestic battery incident." The suspect 
(identified as David Burggraf) had "left the scene in a white 1999 
Suburban," but later returned to the Lodge. Upon arrival at the scene, the 
deputy involved made contact with Mr. Burggraf. The defendant was 
asked "what was going on," and he reported "he had just beat up his wife 
and wrecked his car." While speaking to Mr. Burggraf, the deputy "could 
smell the presence of an alcoholic beverage coming from David." In 
addition, the defendant "exhibited slurred speech, glassy, bloodshot eyes 
and had great difficulty standing." Mr. Burggraf appeared to be "very 
intoxicated," and was placed in handcuffs. 
A witness to the defendant's vehicle accident (Tyler Treece) was 
subsequently contacted. Tyler had been "bow hunting in the woods when 
he heard a loud crash." Tyler "walked toward the noise and found the 
suburban [sic] wrecked with David inside." According to Tyler, Mr. 
Burggraf then exited the vehicle, "started calling Tyler names," and started 
"swinging at him." Tyler indicated "no punches connected," before "some 
other unidentified person arrived" and "gave David a ride back to the 
lodge." 
After speaking to Tyler, the defendant's wife (Ashley Burggraf) was 
interviewed. Ashley indicated she and Mr. Burggraf had been at the 
Lakeside Lodge bar for a family member's wedding. Ashley reported her 
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husband "had several shots and beers." According to Ashley, the 
defendant had been "on the dance floor" holding his infant daughter, 
"when he dropped her and she landed on her head." Ashley indicated Mr. 
Burggraf "was embarrassing her with his drunken behavior and putting 
their kid's safety in danger," so she "asked him to leave the bar." The 
defendant complied with that request, leaving the bar with Ashley. While 
in the parking lot of the lodge, Ashley indicated Mr. Burggraf grabbed her 
"wrist and pinned her up against their suburban [sic]." Ashley stated she 
was able to get free, and then proceeded to the "room they had rented for 
the night." The defendant followed Ashley, and "punched" her in the 
chest. Ashley was holding the couple's "three month old daughter" at that 
time. The baby was "knocked out of her arms and landed on the bed 
behind" Ashley. As reported by Ashley, her husband then "punched her in 
the jaw while she tried unsuccessfully to fight back." Ashley's sister (Amy 
Woodhouse) was also present in the room. She was able to pick up the 
baby "along with another child present", and left to contact the police. At 
that point, Mr. Burggraf "said something unintelligable [sic] about a pistol, 
left the room, got into the suburban [sic] and left at a high rate of speed." 
While speaking with witnesses on the scene, the defendant remained in a 
patrol vehicle. At some point, Mr. Burggraf began "kicking the side 
window with both feet." He was contacted in the vehicle, and was told to 
stop kicking. The defendant failed to comply. As a result, Mr. Burggraf 
was removed from the patrol vehicle, placed in leg irons, and returned to 
the vehicle (despite his resistance). 
The defendant was later transported to the Fremont County Jail, and was 
subsequently charged with various crimes. 
(PSI, p.4.) 
The state charged Burggraf with domestic battery in the presence of a child (a 
felony), and felony DUI based on his having been convicted of two prior DUI offenses 
within the previous ten years. (R., pp.40-42.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Burggraf 
pied guilty to felony DUI without any sentencing agreement and, in return, all other 
charges were dismissed; Burggraf also agreed to pay restitution. 1 (R., pp.80-81; 
1 Although Burggraf's trial counsel explained at the January 14, 2014 change of plea 
hearing that the plea agreement called for the state to dismiss the domestic battery 
charge, that charge had been dismissed on September 25, 2013 on the state's motion 
to dismiss it in the interest of justice. (R., pp.43-44.) 
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1/14/14 Tr. p.4, L.8 - p.5, L.7.) The district court sentenced Burggraf to a unified ten 
years with four years fixed, and ordered him to pay "restitution if requested by the 
Prosecuting Attorney." (R., p.88.) The state prepared -- but evidently did not file -- a 
motion for restitution for the loss incurred by Ashley Burggraf resulting from the damage 
to the Suburban, which (according to Burggraf's trial counsel at a later hearing on 
restitution) "was owned by him and his wife."2 (5/27/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-11.) Burggraf filed 
an Objection to State's Motion for Restitution (R., pp.99-100), and a Rule 35, I.C.R., 
motion for reduction of sentence based on leniency (R., pp.109-110). On July 22, 2014, 
the district court held a hearing on Burggraf's Rule 35 motion, and, after testimony was 
presented, the court denied the motion. (R., p.135; 7/22/14 Tr., p.38, L.1 - p.48, L.21.) 
At a hearing held May 27, 2014, the parties and district court delineated that the 
restitution amount sought by the state on behalf of Ashley Burggraf, and contested by 
Burggraf, was the $500 deductible that was subtracted from the insurer's payment to 
her for the loss resulting from the wrecked Suburban.3 (See generally 5/27/14 Tr., pp.4-
24.) At the end of the hearing, the district court explained that, with a divorce pending 
2 A letter dated June 12, 2015, from Kootenai County Deputy Clerk Becky Harrigfeld 
was lodged with this Court. In that letter, Ms. Harrigfeld explained that the state's 
Motion for Restitution and the district court's Order Awarding Restitution were never 
filed and she is unable to provide them in this appeal. 
3 Defendant's Exhibits A (insurance company letter to Ashley Burggraf) and B (copy of 
insurance company check for $5,241.28), part of the record on appeal, were not 
specifically identified during the initial restitution hearing on May 27, 2014. However, it 
appears the district court and the parties reviewed them and relied upon them for that 
hearing. (See 5/27/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.14-23 ("The record before the Court, and you 
haven't objected to the attachments, in fact we've both looked at it [sic] them and you 
relied on them .... ").) Defendant's Exhibits A and B were admitted into evidence at the 
August 26, 2014 hearing on Burggraf's motion for reconsideration. (8/26/14 Tr., p.7, 
L.21 - p.8, L.22.) It should be noted that the insurance company issued the check as 
payable "to the Order of ASHLEY BURGGRAF & DAVID BURGGRAF." (Def. Ex. B.) 
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between Burggraf and his wife, it was not appropriate for it to decide what is and is not 
community property. (5/27/14 Tr., p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.9.) The court ruled that Burggraf 
had to pay Ashley Burggraf for the $500 deductible on the insurance payment for the 
damage to the Suburban resulting from the DUI incident.4 (5/27/14 Tr., p.22, L.23 -
p.24, L.1.) Burggraf filed a motion to reconsider (R., p.121), and after a second 
hearing, the district court ruled that, in order to make the victim whole, she was entitled 
to have Burggraf pay her for the $500 deductible amount, explaining that if the damage 
to the Suburban would have been caused by a third-party defendant, "she would have 
been entitled to $5,700 instead of the $5,200 she got" (8/26/14 Tr., p.12, L.6-p.13, L.2; 
see R., p.137 (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Restitution)). The 
court filed an Amended Order for Restitution on April 17, 2015, ordering Burggraf to pay 
Ashley Burggraf $500. (4/17/15 Amended Order for Restitution; see 3/19/15 Order 
Granting Motion to Augment; see also n.2, supra (county clerk unable to locate initial 
restitution order).) 
Burggraf filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.139-142, 147-150.) 
4 Ashley Burggraf filed for divorce from Burggraf in October 2013, and that proceeding 
was still pending during the May 27, 2014 initial hearing on restitution. (See 7/22/14 Tr., 
p.8, Ls.1-9.) 
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ISSUES 
Burggraf states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding $500 in 
restitution to Ms. Burggraf because the car Mr. Burggraf crashed 
was community property? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Burggraf's Rule 35 motion? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Burggraf failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
requiring him to pay restitution for the insurance deductible of $500 borne by his victim? 
2. Has Burggraf failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Burggraf Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In 
Requiring Him To Pay Restitution For The $500 Insurance Deductible 
A Introduction 
Burggraf challenges the district court's award of $500 to Ashley Burggraf, his wife 
at all times relevant to this appeal,5 for the "deductible" amount subtracted from the 
insurance proceeds covering the loss resulting from Burggraf wrecking the Suburban 
during his felony DUI incident. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) In short, Burggraf contends 
Ashley is not entitled to the full value of the deductible amount because the car was 
community property. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9.) Burggraf's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The district court's decision to order restitution, and in what amount, is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 
(Ct. App. 2007). 
C. The District Court Properly Ordered Burggraf To Pay Restitution In The Amount 
Of $500 For The Insurance Deductible 
Idaho's restitution statutes require the perpetrators of crime to compensate 
victims for economic losses actually suffered. I.C. § 19-5304(2). '"Economic loss' 
includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken [or] destroyed." I.C. § 19-
5304(1 )(a). "[D]etermination of economic loss [is] based upon the civil preponderance 
5 Burggraf's request that this Court take judicial notice of the January 9, 2015 Decree of 
Divorce and related Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the Burggraf's 
divorce should be denied because they are wholly irrelevant to this appeal due to the 
fact that district court's restitution hearing and rulings predate the divorce rulings and 
orders. (See Appellant's Brief, p.1, n.1, and Appendix A to Appellant's Brief.) 
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of evidence standard." State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284, 192 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (citing I.C. § 19-5304(6)). The restitution amount "can be established by the 
owner of the stolen property," or, where the economic loss is not possible to ascertain 
with complete precision, a court may award restitution using "reasonable methods 
based on the best evidence available under the circumstances." State v. Lombard, 149 
Idaho 819,823, 242 P.3d 189, 193 (Ct. App. 2010). 
"One of the purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the 
cost and inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their 
losses." State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886, 231 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 2008). The 
public policy underlying the statute "favor[s] full compensation to crime victims who 
suffer economic loss." State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 
1989). The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the 
trial court's sound discretion. State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct. 
App. 2010). The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed 
if supported by substantial evidence. Smith, 144 Idaho at 692, 169 P.3d at 280. 
Correctly applying the above legal standards to the facts before it, the district 
court determined that Burggraf's criminal conduct resulted in the loss of the $500 
deductible that was required in order to receive the insurance company's funds to pay 
for the damage done to the Suburban. The total loss to Ashley Burggraf was, as the 
insurance company determined, $5,741.28. (Def. Ex. A.) However, the insurance 
company paid Ashley $5,241.28 - which is $500 less than the amount needed to make 
her whole. (Def. Ex. B.) Although the $500 shortfall was the result of the deductible 
payment being subtracted from the insurance payment, because Burggraf's criminal 
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conduct caused that deductible loss to Ashley, he is responsible for making her whole 
just as if he were unrelated to her. The court explained at the hearing on Burggraf's 
motion for reconsideration: 
If the accident had been caused by a third-party defendant who 
wasn't a relative, then I think she would have been entitled to $5,700 
instead of the $5,200 that she got. I understand these were a unique set 
of circumstances, but based upon those unique factors, in order to make 
the defendant [sic] whole, I'm going to conclude that she would be entitled 
to have the defendant pay the deductible because it was his wrongdoing 
that resulted in the party's insurance, if you will in making this payment 
instead of somebody else. 
And again, I think she would have been entitled to be put back in 
the same position she was before the accident, which is $5,700, and she 
only got $5,200 and she didn't contribute in any way to that deduction, so 
therefore I think in the interest of justice and in the interest of making a 
victim whole, which is a constitutional right guaranteed in Idaho, I think it 
would be appropriate for the defendant to pay that additional amount of 
unpaid deductible as restitution. And that would be the ruling of the Court. 
(8/26/14 Tr., p.12, L.6 - p.13, L.2 (emphasis added).) 
The district court correctly, and equitably, determined that because Burggraf was 
solely responsible for the wrongdoing that resulted in the use of the insurance coverage, 
he was also responsible for the deductible amount required to trigger that coverage. 
Therefore, even if Ashley was only entitled to half (or some other portion) of the 
proceeds covering the damage to the Suburban due to community property 
considerations, she still would have had to pay the entire $500 deductible in order to get 
any of her share of proceeds. The district court appears to have recognized that fact, 
stating at the initial restitution hearing, "the evidence before the Court ... suggests that 
there was a $500 amount that she had to pay. And that's typically an appropriate 
amount of restitution if someone has to pay a deductible to get something fixed." 
(5/27/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.14-20 (emphasis added).) The district court correctly concluded 
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that, in order to make Ashley whole, Burggraf was responsible for the entire $500 
deductible because -- regardless of Ashley's share of ownership of the vehicle -- that 
amount had to be paid in order for Ashley to receive any payment for the damage 
caused by Burggraf. 
Burggraf argues that, "[b]ecause the car was community property, both spouses 
jointly suffered an economic loss and the court should have ordered Mr. Burggraf to pay 
$500 in restitution to the marital estate, not to Ms. Burggraf individually." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.9.) A similar argument was rejected in State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 296 P.3d 
412 (Ct. App. 2013), where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the unclean hands of 
the defendant prevented him from apportioning the losses to the other two members of 
the limited liability company (LLC) he stole from. The Hill decision explained: 
Finally, Hill submits he was entitled to a reduction of the amount of 
restitution under a theory of unjust enrichment to firm members Brad 
Jordan and Patrick Hall. Hill argues the restitution amount should be 
reduced based on his status as a member of the firm who was financially 
harmed because of his crimes. Because Brad Jordan and Patrick Hall 
were not each entitled to one-half of the assets of Jordan, Hill and Hall, 
Inc., Hill argues they would be unjustly enriched by each receiving 
restitution totaling more than one-third of the amount Hill unlawfully took 
from the business. The district court found Hill's argument, made without 
reference to any legal authority, without merit. The district court wrote: 
"Hill is not a 'victim' under I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e). Thus Hill cannot claim 
one-third of the amounts owed .... This Court finds Hill owes restitution 
to Brad Jordan and [Patrick] Hall. It is these two individuals alone who 
suffered the loss at Hill's hands." The district court noted that restitution is 
an equitable concept, citing Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 656, 570 
P.2d 1334, 1346 (1977), and concluded that Hill was not entitled to 
restitution with his unclean hands, Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 
92 P.3d 492, 501 (2004). Due to the fact that Hill could not be a victim 
and due to the equitable considerations, the district court rejected Hill's 
position. We agree with the district court's analysis and determinations. 
Consistent with the district court's equitable considerations, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that members of a limited liability 
company, such as was Jordan, Hill and Hall, Inc., owe each other fiduciary 
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duties variously defined as ones of fairness, honesty, good faith, loyalty, 
trust, and care. Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 769, 
203 P.3d 694, 699 (2009). A breach of that fiduciary relationship can give 
rise to liability to an aggrieved member. Id. The district court's remedy in 
ordering restitution to Brad Jordan and Patrick Hall from Hill is consistent 
with the protection and preservation of the relationship and fiduciary duties 
that members of LLC entities should expect from each other. 
Furthermore, it would be an anomaly for Hill to profit by his own 
wrongdoing, by receiving credit for one-third of the economic loss caused 
to the firm by his own misappropriations. Hill has already received the use 
and benefit of funds and property gained and purchased through his 
unlawful schemes. The economic loss sustained by the firm as a victim 
through Hill's misappropriations was $290,768.29, not just two-thirds of 
that sum. In fixing the amount of restitution, I.C. § 19-5304(2) requires 
the court "to consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim 
as a result of the offense." Based upon the evidence presented at the trial 
and the restitution hearing, $290,768.29 was the value of the funds Hill 
wrongfully took from the firm. We do not read the description of economic 
loss in the restitution statute to require apportionment of funds unlawfully 
taken from the firm correlative to any interest of the defendant therein. 
Because the evidence fully supports the district court's findings and 
conclusions, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining the amounts of the restitution required. 
We also reject Hill's suggestion that the restitution order will result 
in a windfall or unjust enrichment for Jordan and Hall. The restitution 
order is consistent with the statutory plan to recompense the parties 
harmed by a defendant's criminal conduct. Jordan and Hall jointly 
suffered a loss of $290,768.29 from Hill's criminal conduct. He is 
responsible to them for the full amount. Accord, People v. Day, 2011 II 
[sic] App (2d) 091358, 354 Ill.Dec. 557, 958 N.E.2d 300 (2011) (upholding 
restitution awarded to one member of two-person law firm for entire 
amount wrongfully taken by other member of firm). 
Hill, 154 Idaho at 212-213, 296 P.3d at 418-419. 
The parallels between Hill and Burggraf's case are apparent. Regardless of the 
form of the entity whose integrity has been breached - marital community or LLC - a 
member of the entity should be precluded from, in essence, claiming victimhood and 
apportioning loss to the entity caused by his own wrongdoing. Just as Hill was not 
entitled to limit his two partners' restitution loss to two-thirds of the total harm he inflicted 
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on the LLC, Burggraf should not be able to apportion Ashley's loss for the damage he 
inflicted on the marital community. Further, as was true of the victims in Hill, Ashley will 
not receive a "windfall or unjust enrichment" by being awarded restitution for the $500 
deductible loss.6 See Hill, 154 Idaho at 213, 296 P.3d at 419. 
The district court's restitution order should be affirmed because it is supported 
by substantial, competent evidence and there is no support for Burggraf's contention 
that the $500 deductible loss should have been assigned to the marital community, or 
that the amount should have been apportioned to reflect Ashley's (assumed) community 
share of ownership of the Suburban. 
6 The only windfall in this case has been received by Burggraf. Of the $5,741.28 
monetary loss caused by his felonious conduct, Burggraf has only been ordered to pay 
$500 in restitution to Ashley. The insurance company has borne the brunt of Burggraf's 
criminal conduct, having paid $5,241.28 to Ashley without any reimbursement ordered 
from Burggraf. (See 4/17/15 Amended Order for Restitution; Def. Exs. A and B.) 
Insurers who pay for losses are, by definition, "victims" for purposes of restitution. I.C. § 
19-5304(a). They are entitled to recover their out-of-pocket expenses in reimbursing 
the victims pursuant to contract. I.C. § 19-5304(a). Restitution should be paid to 
insurers who have reimbursed the direct victims of crime absent evidence "that the 
insurance payments were inflated or unreasonable in relation to the [losses the 
defendant] caused." State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 879-80, 71 P.3d 477, 478-79 (Ct. 
App. 2003). 
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11. 
Burggraf Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His I.C.R. 35 
Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Burggraf contends that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for 
reduction of sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-12.) A review of the record reveals that 
the district court acted well within its discretion in declining to reduce Burggraf's 
sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the 
Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman. 144 
Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Burggraf must show 
that the sentence imposed was "excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kl 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion By Denying 
Burggraf's l.C.R. 35 Motion 
Approximately two months after he was sentenced, Burggraf filed a Rule 35 
motion for reduction of his sentence based on leniency. (R., pp.109-110.) At the 
hearing on that motion, Burggraf's counsel argued that Burggraf's sentence for felony 
DUI should be reduced because (1) he drove (under the influence of alcohol) away from 
a wedding under a "strong provocation" because his wife made him attend it even 
though it made him feel uncomfortable, and, while at the wedding, he was informed that 
several members of his wife's family had threatened to harm him, and (2) the district 
court originally adjusted the fixed portion of Burggraf's sentence in conjunction with a 
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sentence he was already serving with the intention of giving him a total of about five 
additional years of prison to serve before being parole eligible - but he actually had at 
least two more years left to serve in the other case than the court anticipated. 
At a hearing on his Rule 35 motion, Burggraf presented the testimony of (1) 
Ashley Burggraf, his estranged wife (i.e., pending divorce) at the time of the hearing, (2) 
his mother, Kathryn Burggraf, and (3) himself. (See generally 7/22/14 Tr.) At the end of 
the hearing, the district court denied Burggraf's Rule 35 motion. (7/22/14 Tr., p.38, L.1 
- p.48, L.21.) 
On appeal, Burggraf first argues that, at the Rule 35 motion hearing, he 
"presented additional information to support his contention that he was provoked to 
drive while intoxicated[,]" noting he testified that he did not feel comfortable going to the 
wedding, his mother testified she heard him express that feeling, and he testified "he 
drove off because someone told him that Ms. Burggraf's family was going to beat him 
up." (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) As shown in its following comments, the district court 
was familiar with Burggraf's "provocation" claim and was well within its reasonable 
discretion in determining that any mitigation value it had under I.C. §19-2521 (2) did not 
require a reduction of his sentence: 
Aside from the defendant's record, which I already looked over, the 
defendant's conduct was very serious. 
The incident involving his wife, there was an incident involving a 
child. Allegations that a child had been dropped on its head on a dance 
floor in a bar. And later during an altercation with the wife, the child was 
present, and it made him injured. That the defendant took off in their car 
angry or absent of fear, but certainly angry, drove quickly. I don't know if 
there was any allegations [sic] that he was driving at highway speeds, but 
there was an allegation that he came within inches of hitting a couple that 
were walking along the road, almost hitting them. And that however he 
was driving, maybe it was attributable to recklessness, but certainly he 
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was driving with a blood alcohol content of almost two and a half times the 
legal limit of .197. He was driving so erratically that he drove off the road. 
And there may have been some level of provocation. I know that 
clearly the defendant wasn't happy, and reading his own version of the 
events on page 4 of the PSI document, he admitted that he was very 
irritated about a lot of things that night. That he was irritated about the 
wedding in general, irritated about it being held in a bar, irritated that the 
children had to be there, he was later irritated - I think that he was in 
charge of baby-sitting the kids. There was [sic] a lot of things happening 
that night that got him really, really bad [sic] mood. And I'm not going to 
discount that. There's no question he was ticked off about a lot of things, 
but none of those factors can justify his decision for anger; it doesn't justify 
it. And then how he reacted after drinking is significant. And, again, we 
can't excuse behavior just because someone was intoxicated. We're 
responsible for how we act when we choose to drink. And he had every 
reason not to drink, because he had a history of problems with alcohol, 
and most importantly because he was on parole, he knew that drinking or 
being in a bar would be in violation of his parole. 
So again, it's just a very sad situation. I think I said at the 
sentencing that I didn't think the defendant was necessarily a bad guy, I 
just noted that he had a tendency to do bad things. And this was a good 
example of it that night. This was the defendant's fifth felony, and to place 
the defendant on probation at that time just did not seem appropriate. 
So the Court has listened carefully to the testimony, and I note that 
the ex-wife testified about some of the things that happened that night, 
and certainly admitted that the defendant had reason to be upset and in a 
bad mood. The defendant testified that he was driving as fast as he 
claimed he was driving. The defendant's mother explained a little bit of the 
history of the relationship that I think is helpful to the Court. But after 
considering those facts, again those are factors I think were important for 
the Court to consider, and I have considered those as part of my equation, 
and I don't think it changes the ultimate analysis. 
The sentence, I think, for someone that's a five-time felon, 
committing a DUI, that this was not a garden variety first felony DUI. ... 
This sentence was a reflection of the defendant's body of work, as well as 
the extremely aggravating nature of the circumstances. And although 
there may have been some provocation, the other aggravating factors in 
the case are significant enough to outweigh that. 
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So after considering it carefully, and respectful of I think the sound 
arguments made by counsel and Mr. Burggraf, the Court is going to deny 
the Rule 35 motion at this time. 
(7/22/14 Tr., p.42, L.15 - p.47, L.24.) 
As the district court reasonably determined, even if Burggraf was uncomfortable 
or felt threatened by being at the wedding, "the other aggravating factors in the case are 
significant enough to outweigh that." (7/22/14 Tr., p.47, Ls.18-20.) Burggraf had a 
serious criminal history of four prior felony convictions and was on parole at the time of 
his current offense (7/22/14 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-21), and his sentence was "a reflection of 
[his] body of work, as well as the extremely aggravating nature of the circumstances" 
(7/22/14 Tr., p.47, Ls.15-18). 
In regard to Burggraf's argument that the district court intended at the sentencing 
hearing to limit the total of his two prison terms to about five years, the district court had 
other thoughts on the matter, explaining: 
Now, looking at my sentence that was imposed of ten years, four 
fixed and six indeterminate, I believe I did consider the fact that the 
defendant had another charge, given the length of time between his 2000 
- I believe it was a 2008 conviction, or 2007 conviction, I guess there were 
2008 cases for which he was on parole, I just didn't feel it would be 
appropriate or logical to make my sentence concurrent. I felt that justice 
and common sense dictated my sentence be consecutive. 
But I was aware that he still had time to serve. And I believe he 
had time to serve in his term. However, I didn't take that in to account in 
my sentence. I believe I commented, and I could be wrong, but my notes 
reflect that at the time of my sentencing, I said that I would have given him 
a five-year fixed sentence, but because I was aware he would likely have 
some additional time to serve, I knocked a year off and made it a fixed 
term, four years instead of five years. 
So I think the Court has already taken that in to account. I didn't 
know how many years he had already served, but I just felt like because 
he had to serve some more time, I gave him a fixed term; so I think I've 
already taken that into account. 
15 
(7/22/14 Tr., p.45, L.8 - p.46, L.7.) Burggraf's contention that the district court desired 
to keep the combined total of the fixed time on his current sentence and the certain 
prison time in his other case (i.e., before becoming parole eligible again) to five years 
was expressly refuted by the court. Rather, the court decided that, regardless of how 
much time Burggraf had left to serve in his other case, it would reduce its typical five-
year fixed term to four years as an act of mercy that in no way reflected a guarantee of 
a combined five years. 
Burggraf has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 
Nothing presented during the Rule 35 hearing required the district court to change its 
decision not to reduce Burggraf's sentence. This Court should therefore affirm the 
district court's order denying the motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
awarding $500 restitution to Ashley Burggraf, and also affirm the district court's order 
denying Burggraf's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 12th day of November, 2015. 
C. McKINNEY 
ty Attorney General 
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